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Abstract: In fragments of the lost Protrepticus, preserved in Iamblichus, Aristotle responds to 
Isocrates’ worries about the excessive demandingness of theoretical philosophy. Contrary to 
Isocrates, Aristotle holds that such philosophy is generally feasible for human beings. In 
defense of this claim, Aristotle offers the progress argument, which appeals to early Greek 
philosophers’ rapid success in attaining exact understanding. In this paper, I explore and 
evaluate this argument. After making clarificatory exegetical points, I examine the argument’s 
premises in light of pressing worries that the argument reasonably faces in its immediate 
intellectual context, the dispute between Isocrates and Aristotle. I also relate the argument to 
modern concerns about philosophical progress. I contend that the argument withstands these 
worries, and thereby constitutes a reasonable Aristotelian response to the Isocratean challenge. 
 
Aristotle identifies philosophical theôria as our complete happiness as human beings (EN X.7, 
1177a17). But does this activity require an understanding that is simply too demanding for us 
to possess? Aristotle’s contemporary, Isocrates, answers yes. In Isocrates’ view, theoretical 
philosophers, who focus on “astronomy and geometry and studies of that sort” (Antidosis 261), 
seek an understanding beyond the ready grasp of finite human beings. 1 Such inquiries are 
“vain” (Antidosis 269). Students, Isocrates contends, should not “allow their minds to be dried 
up by these barren subtleties, nor stranded on the speculations of the ancient sophists,” among 
                                               




whom he counts Empedocles, Parmenides, and Melissus (Antidosis 268). Given our human 
limitations, Isocrates thinks, the understanding that philosophical theôria requires proves too 
toilsome and laborious to be worth pursuing. If this Isocratean demandingness worry holds, and 
if our complete happiness is an ultimate end of pursuit, then perhaps we should deny that our 
complete happiness consists in philosophical theôria.2 
In fragments of his lost work, the Protrepticus, Aristotle exhorts his audience to pursue 
a conception of philosophical theôria broadly continuous with the sort of philosophy that he 
sketches in Metaphysics A.1-2.3 As part of his protreptic, Aristotle responds to Isocrates’ 
demandingness worry.4  This reply is preserved in Chapter 6 of Iamblichus’ Protrepticus 
(40.15-20/B55), as well as in Chapter 26 of Iamblichus’ De Communi Mathematica Scientia 
82.17-22.5 Here, Aristotle argues for the claim that philosophy – the “acquisition and use of 
wisdom” (κτῆσίϛ τε καὶ χρῆσιϛ σοφίαϛ: 6, 40.2-3/B53; cf. 6, 37.7-9/B8) – is easy: 
For with no pay coming from people to those who philosophize, on account of which 
[the latter] would have toiled that strenuously, and with a great lead extended to the 
other arts, nevertheless their overtaking [the practitioners of other arts] in exactness 
despite running a short time seems to me to be a sign of the easiness regarding 
philosophy.  
 
                                               
2 For a full discussion of Isocrates’ demandingness worry, see Walker 2019.  
3 On these continuities, see Walker 2018: 32-33. On the Protrepticus and Metaphysics A.1-2, 
more generally, see Jaeger 1948, 68-71; Wareh 2012, 47-48; and Seggiaro 2012, 62-73. 
4 On the Protrepticus, more generally, as a response to Isocrates, see Einarson 1936: 272-278; 
Jaeger 1948: 55-60; Düring 1961: 20-24, 33-35; Van der Meeren 2011: xxvi-xxx; Wareh 2012: 
41-54; Collins 2015: 244-245, 255-257; Hutchinson and Johnson unpublished work B. 
Hutchinson and Johnson 2005 authenticate the Aristotle fragments found in chapters 6-12 of 
Iamblichus’ Protrepticus. Hutchinson and Johnson 2018 argue that Aristotle’s Protrepticus was 
a dialogue that featured an Isocratean character; they also now attribute De Communi 
Mathematica Scientia (DCMS) 26 to Aristotle’s Protrepticus. 
5 Proclus, Commentary on Euclid’s Elements, Prologue 1, 9, 28.14-17 closely paraphrases parts 
of the progress argument and attributes it to Aristotle. In what follows, I use Pistelli’s 1888 
edition of Iamblichus’s Protrepticus. I cite passages primarily by reference to the Pistelli 
chapter, page, and line number, and then by the “B” numbering used in Düring’s (1961) 
reconstruction. For the DCMS, I use Festa’s 1891 edition. I have consulted various translations 
(including Düring’s, as well as Hutchinson and Johnson’s reconstruction-in-progress of the 




Τὸ γὰρ µήτε µισθοῦ παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γιγνοµένου τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσι, δι’ ὃν 
συντόνως οὕτως ἂν διαπονήσειαν, πολύ γε προεµένους εἰς τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ὅµως ἐξ 
ὀλίγου χρόνου θέοντας προεληλυθέναι ταῖς ἀκριβείαις, σηµεῖόν µοι δοκεῖ τῆς περὶ τὴν 
φιλοσοφίαν εἶναι ῥᾳστώνης.6 
 
According to this progress argument, the practitioners of various forms of expertise are in a 
kind of race with respect to exactness. In this race, some practitioners get an early lead. Yet 
philosophers, who leave the starting gate later than their competitors, nevertheless manage to 
surpass them. Philosophers’ rapid progress in exactness under these conditions, Aristotle 
contends, shows that philosophy is, in some sense, easy. To be sure, philosophy is not 
completely easy, i.e., effortlessly simple, or free from any and all difficulties. Yet philosophy 
is not merely possible, but overall difficult, i.e., capable of some realization, but laborious on 
the whole. Instead, despite posing some inevitable difficulties, philosophy remains overall easy, 
i.e., generally feasible for human beings who commit reasonable effort to its pursuit.7 (In what 
follows, one should keep in mind the precise sense in which Aristotle thinks that philosophy is 
easy. Although Aristotle’s thesis is controversial, it is not the counterintuitive claim that 
philosophy is especially easy, or among the very easiest of human activities.) 
The progress argument is not Aristotle’s only response to Isocrates’ demandingness 
worry. For immediately after the progress argument, Aristotle notes the pleasure that people 
take in philosophizing under conditions of leisure (40.20-24/B56). He also highlights 
philosophy’s not requiring external resources (40.24-41.2/B56). We can reasonably read these 
passages as offering further defense of philosophy’s easiness. Yet only in the progress argument 
does Aristotle explicitly claim that philosophy is easy.  
In what follows, then, I examine the Protrepticus’ progress argument as a key part of 
Aristotle’s response to Isocrates’ demandingness worry. I explore this brief, but puzzling, 
                                               
6 DCMS 82.18 uses τοῖϛ φιλοσόφοιϛ instead of τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσι. 




argument for three reasons. (1) Scholars have largely neglected the Protrepticus as a source of 
Aristotle’s ethical views. But the progress argument sheds new light on how Aristotle defends 
the contemplative life in the face of reasonable external challenges. (2) In contemporary 
philosophy, multiple writers have questioned whether philosophy makes progress, and if so, 
what sort and how.8  By examining the progress argument, and by elucidating Aristotle’s 
background views concerning the modes and means by which philosophers can and do make 
progress in attaining wisdom, we might benefit from Aristotle’s own perspective on these 
issues. (3) Accordingly, the progress argument shows how Aristotle’s ethics and conception of 
the human good find support from some of his views on the nature of, and proper (i.e., wisdom-
conducive) modes of conducting, philosophical inquiry. 
I begin by reconstructing the progress argument’s premises and reasoning. After 
making clarificatory exegetical points, I examine the argument’s premises in light of pressing 
worries that the argument reasonably faces within its immediate intellectual context, viz., the 
dispute between Isocrates and Aristotle. I contend that the argument withstands these worries, 
and thereby constitutes a reasonable Aristotelian response to the Isocratean challenge.  
 
I. In introducing Aristotle’s progress argument, Iamblichus writes that “the acquisition of it 
[i.e., sophia] is much easier than the [acquisition] of other goods” (40.13-14/B54). Following 
Iamblichus’ lead, I take the progress argument to show that philosophy qua acquisition of 
wisdom is easy.9 Philosophy is easy, in other words, because we may feasibly possess wisdom.  
I reconstruct the progress argument as follows: 
(1) If the practitioners of an art or science rapidly attain (surpassing) exactness in 
it without pay as a significant external incentive, then that art or science is apt 
to be easy. 
                                               
8 See, e.g., Dietrich 2011; Chalmers 2015; Cappelen 2017; Stoljar 2017. 




(2) Unlike the practitioners of the other arts, philosophers do not receive pay as a 
significant external incentive to develop philosophy.10 
(3) Nevertheless, philosophers have made rapid progress in surpassing the other 
arts in exactness. 
(4) Thus, philosophy is apt to be easy. [From 1, 2, and 3] 
According to Rhetoric I.6, activities are easy (ῥᾴδια) if they are done “either without pain or in 
a short time” (1363a23). Rhetoric I.6, I take it, does not strictly identify painlessness and rapid 
achievement as necessary conditions of an activity’s easiness. Instead, the Rhetoric construes 
painlessness and rapid achievement as signs of an activity’s easiness. Premise (1) of the 
progress argument alludes to this point. And the progress argument, as a whole, defends 
philosophy’s easiness by arguing that philosophy displays that second “sign” (σηµεῖον) of 
easiness (40.19/B55). Those who philosophize, Aristotle says, have made rapid progress in 
exactness – and all without significant external incentives.11  
Premise (2) does not specify what sort of pay constitutes a significant external 
incentive. But the Protrepticus presumably refers to payment in money as well as honor. 
Consider the substantial section of text at DCMS 26, 83.6-22. This material immediately 
follows a section of the DCMS (82.17-83.2) that overlaps virtually verbatim with Iamblichus, 
Protrepticus 6, 40.12-41, i.e., Aristotle’s defense of philosophy’s easiness. Within this larger 
section, DCMS 83.16-20 observes that people grant honor to other arts and payment to their 
practitioners. People, however, do not support contemplative studies and those who practice 
                                               
10  The progress argument compares philosophy to an art (technê). In Metaphysics A.1-2, 
Aristotle identifies certain similarities between sophia and the productive arts: both understand 
the “why.” Yet sophia differs from the productive arts insofar as it, unlike the latter, does not 
seek an end beyond understanding itself. 
11 As I noted in the introduction, Aristotle also defends philosophy’s pleasantness in a passage 
that immediately follows the progress argument in Protrepticus 6. Aristotle may well think, 
then, that philosophy possesses Rhetoric I.6’s first sign of easiness, viz., the ability to be 
accomplished without pain. That the progress argument and the pleasure argument accord with 
Rhetoric I.6’s advice for constructing protreptic arguments is noticed (explicitly) by Hutchinson 
and Johnson (unpublished work A) and (indirectly) by Düring 1961: 231. On signs, and 
inference from signs, see Prior Analytics II.27 and Rhetoric I.2, 1357a32-33. On Aristotle’s 




them (83.16-18).12 On the contrary, people often aim to prevent others from pursuing such 
studies (83.19-20).13  
Since DCMS 26, 83.6-22 will be relevant in my discussion, I note that many scholars 
have attributed it to Aristotle’s Protrepticus.14 Two exceptions, Düring and Chroust, held that 
since the passage is concerned only with philosophy’s development, it probably originated in 
Aristotle’s On Philosophy.15 By appealing to Iamblichus’ standard methods for incorporating 
material from other authors, however, Hutchinson and Johnson have recently made a solid case 
for attributing DCMS 26, 83.6-22 to Aristotle’s Protrepticus.16 Yet even one who accepts 
Düring’s view can admit that the material reveals Aristotle’s commitments. 
Premise (3) argues that philosophers actually have made rapid progress in exactness. 
Premise (3) is open to two readings, however. On a historical development reading, Aristotle 
is concerned with philosophers’ rapid progress as members of a cooperative intellectual 
enterprise. On this reading, philosophy, through the contributions of these philosophers, has 
developed and advanced quickly as such an enterprise. Its rapid development as an enterprise 
thus signals philosophy’s easiness. On an individual development reading, by contrast, Aristotle 
is concerned with the individuals who learn various arts and sciences. On this reading, Aristotle 
thinks that those individuals who learn philosophy attain exact expertise more rapidly than 
those who learn other bodies of knowledge. The capacity of individual philosophers to do so 
thus signals philosophy’s easiness.17 
                                               
12  Cf. Plato, Republic VI.489a-b; VI.500b; VII.528b-c (though Socrates here insists on 
philosophy’s difficulty); Hippias Major 282b-283b (according to which the likes of 
Anaxagoras lose money).  
13 At EN V.6, 1134b6-7, Aristotle identifies honor as fitting payment (µισθός) for a good ruler. 
On honor and money as (insufficient) payment to philosophers, see Protrepticus 8, 46.11-
15/B102 (a point expressed in a Pythagorean voice); EN IX.1, 1164b2-6. More generally, 
gratitude is properly owed to those who attain greater exactness in knowledge (DC II.5, 287b34-
288a2). 
14 Rose, Walzer, Ross, and Gigon for instance, all include DCMS 26, 83.6-22 in their collections 
of Aristotelian fragments. Edelstein 1967: 69-70 describes the passage as “usually attributed to 
the Protrepticus.” 
15 Düring 1961: 228; Chroust 1975: 93. 
16 Hutchinson and Johnson 2018: 147. 




As stated, the claims that these two readings advance need not conflict. If philosophy’s 
easiness manifests itself in philosophy’s ability to develop rapidly as an enterprise, for instance, 
such easiness would also make it possible for individual philosophers to learn philosophy 
rapidly. Likewise, if philosophy’s easiness is apparent in individual philosophers’ learning 
philosophy rapidly, then such easiness would also conduce to philosophy’s developing rapidly 
as an enterprise of inquiry. But in premise (3), I take it, Aristotle is concerned principally with 
philosophy’s historical development. Consider DCMS 26, 83.6-22, which glosses the argument 
and which invites a certain comparison with Metaphysics A.1, 981b17-25. This passage notes 
the development of (a) productive arts concerned with survival and (b) arts concerned with 
pleasure, e.g., music (83.7-12). It then highlights the rapid subsequent development of 
theoretical inquiries concerning “geometry and logoi and the other educational subjects” 
(83.14-15). This passage suggests, as does Metaphysics A.1-2, that philosophy marks the 
culminating development of those arts and sciences suited for leisure. For philosophy attains 
greater exactness than other arts. Corroborating the historical development reading is Proclus, 
Commentary on Euclid’s Elements, Prologue 1, 9, 28.13-29.13, which paraphrases both (a) the 
progress argument as such and (b) DCMS 83.6-22’s remarks, which highlight the theoretical 
sciences’ rapid development.18 
Premise (3), like the Metaphysics and the rest of the Protrepticus, attributes high 
degrees of exactness to philosophy as it has rapidly developed up to Aristotle’s time. The 
Protrepticus construes philosophy as understanding of “the most exact truth” (7, 42.15-16/B65; 
cf. 10, 55.7-14/B48; 11, 58.8-9/B85). The same general section of DCMS 26 just mentioned 
                                               
18 As further possible support for the historical developmental reading, I note Protrepticus 6, 
40.2-3/B53’s race imagery. Edelstein 1967: 90-91 finds relay race imagery in Aristotle’s 
discussion of the development of the arts in SE 34, 183b29-31.  
   Proclus’ paraphrase of the progress argument focuses exclusively on the mathematical 
sciences’ rapid development. DCMS 26, 83.7-16, however, remarks on the larger development 
of the leisured arts, and insists that once arts conducive to survival and pleasure were perfected, 
people turned toward philosophizing (ἐπεχείρησαν φιλοσοφεῖν: 83.12). Here, Aristotle 
evidently does think that the mathematical sciences were among the theoretical sciences that 
developed rapidly. But I take his ultimate focus, in the Protrepticus as in Metaphysics A.1’s 
remarks on the mathematical sciences that developed in leisure, to be on the development of 




(83.16-22) also notes that “exactness about the truth” is recent (83.6-7). Philosophy is a “most 
exact” understanding or science insofar as it concerns the most fundamental causes and 
explanatory principles, and insofar as such understanding is both most explanatory and deals 
with the fewest principles (Metaphysics A.1, 982a2; A.2, 982a21-28; Posterior Analytics I.27). 
Given the Protrepticus’ other similarities to Metaphysics A, the latter work fleshes out 
what sort of superior progress in exactness premise (3) probably attributes to philosophers. In 
Metaphysics A, Aristotle identifies the quick progress that he believes philosophers have made 
in discerning the fundamental explanatory principles operative in nature. Thus, Aristotle 
highlights the relative inexactness of earlier accounts of nature, beginning with Thales’, and he 
emphasizes how later accounts are more exact. (a) When Anaxagoras intimated something like 
efficient and final causation (e.g., in his talk about nous as a principle of order and motion), 
Aristotle says, “he seemed like a sober person in comparison with those who spoke at random 
earlier” (A.3, 984b15-18; cf. Physics VIII.5, 256b24-27).19 (b) Earlier philosophers, Aristotle 
says, discovered material and efficient causes in an inexact way, “as the untrained act in fights,” 
i.e., swinging away at random (A.4, 985a13-14). Some of these philosophers, however, showed 
greater exactness than their predecessors by discerning efficient causes, and not only material 
causes, at least to some extent (cf. Metaphysics A.3, 984a16-25). (c) The early philosophers 
describe the four causes, at best, “obscurely” (ἀµυδρῶς), “like one who lisps” (ψελλιζοµένῃ: 
A.10, 993a11-16). Aristotle believes himself, however, to have made progress in discerning 
and explicitly demarcating these causes (e.g., in Physics II). In grasping these distinctions, and 
in making progress toward discerning the ultimate causes of things, philosophers attain a more 
exact understanding than the practitioners of other arts and sciences do. 
                                               
19 The Protrepticus quotes Anaxagoras’s claim that human beings live “to contemplate the 
heavens and stars and moon and sun” [51.13-15/B19; cf. EE I.5, 1216a13-14]. The 





If philosophy makes progress, we might wonder, progress over what range? Does 
Aristotle believe in infinite progress, or does progress have some end-point?20 As just intimated, 
Aristotle identifies an ultimate end that regulates philosophical progress, viz., attaining the truth 
about fundamental causes and explanatory principles. In attaining such truth, we seek to fulfill 
our desire to understand for its own sake in the face of wonder (Metaphysics A.1, 980a21; A.2, 
982b12-17; 983a12-17). So, progress in philosophy consists in philosophy’s advancing toward 
its end of fulfilling the desire to understand by attaining truth about fundamental causes and 
principles.  
As philosophers proceed along the path toward such truth and understanding, however, 
their thought can become trapped in aporiai – “impasses” or “losses of way.” In this state, they 
cannot make forward progress, but are in, in a way, tied up (Metaphysics B.1, 995a31-33).21 To 
move forward, philosophers must consider and resolve the dilemmas, for which the reasoning 
seems compelling on both sides, that bind their thinking. In resolving these dilemmas, 
philosophers discern the truth and attain understanding about the principles sought. 
Philosophers thereby progress from what is clearer and more knowable to us to what is clearer 
and more knowable by nature, viz., the fundamental causes and principles themselves (Physics 
I.1, 184a17-21; Metaphysics Z.4, 1029b1-12; EN I.4, 1095a30-b4). (I say more about such 
progress in Part IV.) 
In resolving such aporiai, and in making progress toward truth and exact 
understanding, philosophers thereby also advance philosophy as a science. Philosophy, so 
construed, makes a certain progress toward maturity. Such progress, visible in the other arts, is 
akin to the biological development of living organisms. Thus, poetry makes progress for the 
sake of its mature form as an art, developing from embryonic kinds of mimesis to fully fledged 
tragic drama (Poetics 4). Similarly, Aristotle identifies early philosophy, in its “lisping” pre-
Socratic condition, as a science in its youth (Metaphysics A.10, 993a15-16).  
                                               
20 I thank William Desmond for questions on these matters. On Metaphysics A’s views about 
philosophy’s development, cf. Collobert 2002; M. Frede 2008; Barney 2012: 97-98. 




Aristotle apparently accepted that philosophy was about to attain such maturity. As 
Cicero reports, Aristotle ridiculed earlier philosophers who maintained that they had perfected 
philosophy. Nevertheless, Aristotle thought that philosophy’s rapid progress points to its 
pending potential perfection: “since in a few years a great advance has been made, philosophy 
will in a short time be brought to completion” (Tusculan Disputations III.28.69; fr. 53 R3; 
ROT). We may reasonably wonder in what, exactly, such completeness consists. Yet we need 
not read Aristotle as arguing for the possibility of philosophy’s ending itself altogether upon 
attaining perfection. First, Aristotle thinks that great floods periodically destroy civilization 
(Meteorology I.14, 352a29-32). Hence, he thinks, each art and science has probably been 
discovered in various historical epochs, only to perish and start anew in the next (Metaphysics 
Λ.8, 1074b9-13). Aristotle’s remarks in the Protrepticus about the arts concern their 
development within this cycle, and these remarks allow for philosophy’s rebirth and 
redevelopment in another cycle.22 Second, and more saliently, Aristotle need not have thought 
that philosophy, somehow, was soon about to perish on account of its own success, any more 
than Aristotle thought that living organisms or other arts are apt to perish upon their own 
maturation. Aristotle elsewhere reminds us not to confuse X’s attaining its end (in the normative 
sense) with X’s dying (Physics II.2, 194a30-33). 
In Cicero’s report, then, Aristotle may simply think that philosophers will soon sketch 
a systematic science of wisdom in outline. Thus, in remarks on the development of political 
science, Aristotle notes that “nearly everything has been discovered, but it has not yet been 
connected” (πάντα γὰρ σχεδὸν εὕρηται µέν, ἀλλὰ τὰ µὲν οὐ συνῆκται: Politics II.5, 1264a3-4). 
Similarly, Aristotle may think that a sufficiently systematized sketch of the science of wisdom 
is a robust marker of this science’s completion. Such a sketch, however, would nevertheless be 
open to fuller specification over time (cf. EN I.7, 1098a20-24). More importantly, it would be 
open to ongoing explanatory application as philosophy, in its mature state as a science, is 
                                               
22 DCMS 26, 83.7-8 specifies its concern with how fields of knowledge have developed “after 




actualized by subsequent practitioners who exercise exact understanding to resolve subsequent 
aporiai. Philosophy, once again, would show kinship to the other arts. Thus, once poetry has 
attained maturity, subsequent poets exercise their perfected knowledge to perform their proper 
task, viz., producing well-crafted works of tragedy and comedy. Likewise, once philosophy has 
attained maturity, subsequent philosophers would exercise their perfected understanding to 
perform their proper task as well, viz., contemplating the world and resolving any subsequent 
aporiai that come to light.   
For simplicity, I assume that the progress argument is valid. But is it sound? And how 
well does this argument address Isocratean worries about philosophy’s demandingness, as these 
worries emerge within the argument’s immediate dialectical context? In the next sections, I 
consider the main challenges that an Isocratean can raise.  
 
II. Our Isocratean begins with premise (1). Grant – solely for argument’s sake – that early 
philosophers made rapid progress in attaining greater exactness in their philosophical 
understanding. Even if willing to concede this point, an Isocratean can argue that such progress 
marks a lucky coincidence. And perhaps Aristotle should agree: he compares some of the earlier 
philosophers to inexperienced fighters who nevertheless manage to strike blows (Metaphysics 
A.4, 985a13-16). Any progress among the early Greek philosophers, the thought goes, need not 
imply anything interesting about philosophy’s overall easiness. 
To respond, Aristotle must show that any rapid progress on the part of early Greek 
philosophers was not merely coincidental. Instead, Aristotle must explain such progress in 
terms of philosophy’s own proper features. To that end, Aristotle can appeal, first, to the ways 
in which nature itself regulates and propels philosophical investigations. He can appeal, second, 
to certain aspects of human nature, and to the status of philosophers as participants in a 
cooperative enterprise. These features of philosophy conduce to its overall easiness and explain 
the early philosophers’ rapid progress. 
On the first feature: Consider, for instance, Aristotle’s remarks on how early Greek 




causes as well. Initially, Aristotle suggests, these thinkers reasonably recognized the material 
cause (Metaphysics A.3, 984a16). All natural bodies are generated out of certain material stuffs 
(984a18). Yet appeal to matter to explain generation and corruption proves too incomplete, for 
material-causal explanations themselves give rise to new questions: we can ask “on account of 
what does this happen, and what is the cause?” (984a21). Material stuffs, after all, do not all by 
themselves generate natural bodies. Neither wood nor bronze causes itself to change (984a22-
25).   
Consequently, matter’s insufficiency for fully accounting for generation and corruption 
itself led philosophers to identify other causes. “And as people thus advanced,” Aristotle says, 
“the things themselves served as guides for them and compelled them to search” (984a18-19); 
these philosophers “were compelled by the truth itself” (984b10-11). Philosophers found 
themselves “compelled to follow the phenomena” and to account for them adequately, a task 
that pushed these philosophers forward to make new discoveries (A.5, 986b31). Steered by the 
phenomena, these philosophers thereby found themselves in a position to discern the efficient 
cause, at least in some way (A.3, 984a17-27). Moreover, Aristotle suggests, the phenomena 
continued to direct inquirers forward. For as the early Greek philosophers attempted to make 
sense of generation in terms of material and efficient causes, the explanatory insufficiency of 
such causes came to light. Grappling with the attendant aporiai, the early philosophers were 
primed to discern the formal cause. “Even Empedocles occasionally stumbles upon this,” 
Aristotle says, “led by the truth itself, and is forced to say that the substantial being and the 
nature is the account” (PA I.1, 642a17-24; trans. Lennox).  
In all these cases, Aristotle can say, nature itself guided the early philosophers’ progress 
toward truth and greater exactness in understanding. In the first instance, natural phenomena 
elicited wonder in these philosophers and called out for explanation (Metaphysics A.2, 982b12-
17). Later, as these philosophers began to progress in their investigations, natural phenomena 
that these philosophers could not explain suggested to such philosophers the next steps to take. 
Philosophers found themselves “compelled” by natural phenomena that their earlier accounts 




phenomena themselves, then, are apt, on the whole, to guide philosophers aright. Such 
guidance, in turn, is apt to make acquiring wisdom feasible.23 
On the second feature: Aristotle can further explain how the early Greek philosophers 
attained rapid progress by appealing (a) to our natural truth-receptiveness as human beings and 
(b) to general cooperative mechanisms by which human inquirers are apt to discern 
philosophical truth. Here, Aristotle concedes some of Isocrates’ worries about the limitations 
of human cognitive capacities. Aristotle grants that we face difficulties when we philosophize 
individually. It is “not easy,” he says, to be continuously active by oneself (EN IX.9, 1170a6-
7). Our individual truth-attaining capacities are constrained, especially concerning the non-
sensible objects of intellect (Protrepticus 6, 38.14-22/B34; 7, 44.17-26/B76-77; Metaphysics 
α.1, 993b6-11; cf. PA I.5, 644b23-30). And even when we individually attain part of the truth, 
we might fail to attain other parts of it (Politics II.5, 1264a3-4).  
Yet Aristotle can argue that we are “sufficiently suited by nature for the true, and for 
the most part happen upon the truth” (Rhetoric I.1, 1355a15-17). We are individually receptive 
to the truth (at least in part), given the rational powers that define us as human beings, powers 
that are truth-disclosive (EN VI.2, 1139b12-13). Hence, we each have something useful to 
contribute to an inquiry about some matter, and we are unlikely all to be mistaken (EN I.8, 
1098b27-29; EE I.6, 1216b30-32).  
Further, we can compensate for our individual limitations by philosophizing with 
others. Others can supply perspectives on the truth that we ourselves have overlooked. 
Philosophers therefore will have the greatest success in contemplating truth when “having 
coworkers” (EN X.7, 1177a34-b1). When individuals join together to judge (e.g., a tragic 
drama), they are apt to judge better than when they proceed individually (Politics III.11, 
1281a40-b10; cf. III.15, 1286a25-32; III.16, 1287b24-30). For perhaps each individual is good 
                                               
23 Aristotle suggests ways in which nature itself propels the development of poetry in Poetics 
4, 1449a23; 24, 1460a4; cf. 7, 1451a9. For discussion, see Halliwell 1998: 92-95; Collobert 
2002: 284. Edelstein 1967: 96n87 reasonably suggests that Aristotle gets the thought that reality 




at judging some aspect of a whole (e.g., some aspect of the drama, such as its plot), but not the 
whole (i.e. the complete drama as such).24 Similarly, each inquirer may be good at grasping 
some part of truth as a whole, but not the whole truth. Philosophical progress, then, is a 
cooperative achievement, at least in requiring many to contribute. And the task of acquiring 
wisdom is apt to be easy when one pursues it as part of a cooperative enterprise, one in which 
conversation enables philosophers to aggregate their individual discoveries. “The 
contemplation of truth is, on the one hand, difficult, on the other hand, easy,” Aristotle insists. 
“A sign: no one person can adequately grasp all of it, nor can all fail, but each says something 
about the nature [of things], and while each individually adds either nothing or little to [the 
truth], from all collected comes a certain magnitude” (Metaphysics α.1, 993a30-b5). Other 
thinkers, Aristotle says, help us to attain the truth in two ways. When other thinkers do hit upon 
some part of the truth, they convey it to the rest of us. When they fail to hit upon the truth, they 
spur us on to pursue the truth more fully (Metaphysics α.1, 993b11-19; cf. DA I.2, 403b20-24). 
So understood, the rapid progress in exactness to which the progress argument alludes, 
and which Aristotle describes throughout Metaphysics A, counts as more than a lucky 
coincidence. Instead, it shows philosophers working well together, attaining the ends of truth 
and exact understanding without undue impediment. Moreover, Aristotle’s account of how such 
progress happens coheres, in part, with Isocrates’ own views about how progress happens in 
the other arts. For Isocrates, as for Aristotle, progress occurs through the process of correcting 
earlier contributions to a cooperative enterprise (Evagoras 7). Isocrates, then, should also allow 
progress to take place through such mechanisms in the case of theoretical philosophy.25   
 
III. At this point, the Isocratean can refine the worry about premise (1). Perhaps, the Isocratean 
can say, if early Greek philosophy progressed rapidly without significant external incentives, 
that was because philosophy was easy only for some small set of people with special natural 
                                               
24 See, e.g., Ober 2013: 112 for this thought. 




talents for acquiring wisdom as conceived by Aristotle. Isocrates himself insists that people 
require the right nature if they are apt to excel in rhetoric (Antidosis 186-187; cf. Against the 
Sophists 10, 14-15, 17). Natural ability, he believes, is of greatest importance (Antidosis 189). 
Yet the cognitive skills Isocrates highlights – becoming a good debater and speech-maker – are 
within the general ken of human beings. Thus, he grants that, given sufficient education and 
experience, those who are “less generously endowed by nature” can excel those who are more 
endowed (Antidosis 191). Apparently accepting aspects of Isocrates’ view, Aristotle suggests 
that perhaps some people, by nature, can acquire wisdom more easily than others (see, e.g., 
Topics VIII.14, 163b9-16; DA II.9, 421a23-26; cf. EN X.9, 1179b21-23).26 But even so, the 
Isocratean can say, acquiring the recherché sort of wisdom that Aristotle valorizes need not be 
easy for anyone else, including those whom Aristotle wishes to exhort in the Protrepticus.27   
In reply, assume that some small group of intellectuals with special natural talents did 
in fact play a special role in sparking early Greek theoretical philosophy’s rapid progress, just 
as, say, those with special natural talents for improvisation played a special role in sparking 
progress in poetry (Poetics 4, 1448b21-23). This, of course, would be an important concession 
to Aristotle. For then, acquiring wisdom need not be overall toilsome for human beings as such. 
At least some thinkers were rapidly able to possess wisdom or some approximation of it. And 
for these philosophers initially to have progressed rapidly, acquiring wisdom must have had at 
least some general easiness-conducive features. 
These features of philosophy, however, would also make it feasible for those lacking 
such natural talents to acquire wisdom as well, even if they have a harder time at it. Recall that, 
in identifying philosophical progress as requiring cooperation, Aristotle highlights ways in 
which we gain truer views from better thinkers. Thus, ordinary non-philosophers may not be 
able to acquire wisdom as easily as those especially well-suited to philosophy. Still, acquiring 
                                               
26 See Leunissen 2012: 521-527 for one account of Aristotle’s views on how intelligence varies 
according to individual material natures.   
27 On Isocrates’ conception of philosophy, see Nightingale 1995: 26-28; Cooper 2004: 71-77; 
Depew 2004; Wareh 2012; Collins 2015: 174-177. On Isocrates on the individual’s nature, see 




wisdom need not be overall toilsome for the former, at least when they pursue wisdom with the 
help of the latter. Those for whom philosophy is easiest, after all, can (and do) teach others. 
And those for whom philosophy is more difficult can (and do) learn things from this group that 
they might otherwise find hard to discover on their own. 28  
Still in a concessive spirit, the Isocratean can press another worry against premise (1). 
Perhaps an activity’s rapid initial progress in its early history shows nothing about how easy it 
is later on when more developed. In making whatever initial progress they might have (which 
the Isocratean will insist could not have been very substantial at all), perhaps early philosophers 
simply picked the lowest-hanging philosophical fruit, solving the easiest aporiai rapidly, but 
leaving more difficult, toilsome aporiai (viz., all the rest) for later philosophers. Suppose, then, 
that early philosophers did make initial rapid progress (e.g., by leaving behind Milesian 
materialist monism). If so, perhaps such philosophy, to that highly qualified extent, was easy. 
Still, the Isocratean can insist, later, more developed modes of theoretical inquiry – including 
that to which the Protrepticus exhorts its audience – need not also be easy.  
 In reply, Aristotle does note that those who first philosophized experienced wonder at 
the more obvious aporiai at hand; and, as they made initial progress in resolving these aporiai, 
these philosophers wondered about greater matters (Metaphysics A.2, 982b13-15). Further, 
Aristotle can admit that later philosophizing, having resolved initial aporiai, attains greater 
exactness than earlier modes. But the greater exactness of more developed modes of philosophy 
need not render later modes overall toilsome. For Aristotle can deny any sharp discontinuities 
between (a) earlier, less developed, and (b) later, more developed philosophical inquiry in either 
goals or means. Both (a) and (b) are concerned with first principles and causes. Both (a) and 
                                               
28 Following Curzer 2012: 106, 400, I hold that Aristotelian virtues admit of degrees: see EN 
IV.1, 1120b9-11; IV.3, 1123b26-30; IX.8, 1168a33-35; IX.12, 1172a10-14; X.3, 1173a20-22. 
Hence, philosophy qua acquisition of wisdom could include the possession of sufficiently (if 
incompletely) developed wisdom. Such wisdom, which attains partial clarity and understanding 
about first principles and causes, would constitute a more modest intellectual accomplishment 
than completely developed wisdom. Yet it would be a realistic accomplishment for a broad 
range of people. Such an acquisition and use of wisdom may well be the sort of “philosophy” 




(b) proceed by working through aporiai. And both (a) and (b) attain truth when, guided by 
nature itself, they proceed through similar cooperative mechanisms. Hence, it is unclear why 
later, more developed modes of philosophy, or why aporiai discovered later on, must in 
principle become overall difficult. On the contrary, insofar as more developed and exact modes 
of philosophy successfully overcome the obscurities and imprecisions of earlier modes (cf. 
Metaphysics A.10, 993a15-16), such modes will be easier in a key respect. They will be free of 
the earlier modes’ obscurities and imprecisions. To that extent free from impediments to 
attaining the complete truth, Aristotle can say, these more developed modes have compensating 
easiness-conducive features of their own.  
In the Sophistical Refutations, moreover, Aristotle argues that an art or sciences’s 
founding moment is actually the hardest for its practitioners. “For it may be that in everything, 
as the saying is, ‘the first start is the main part’; and for this reason it is the most difficult; for 
in proportion as it is most potent in its influence, so it is smallest in its compass and therefore 
most difficult to see – but when this is once discovered, it is easier to add and develop the 
remainder” (SE 34, 183b22-26; ROT). This founding moment is relatively challenging because 
it requires the founding innovator to go beyond common ways of perceiving things 
(Metaphysics A.1, 981b13-17). And as Guthrie argues, the randomness and apparent 
arbitrariness of the human world makes it natural to suppose that the world really is controlled 
by divine caprice. Against this background, the initial advance beyond common ways of 
perceiving the world – substituting impersonal, natural explanatory principles for “personal” 
explanations – constitutes a striking intellectual achievement.29 Hence, if philosophers have 
succeeded even in making the difficult first steps as rapidly as they have – with such innovators 
                                               
29 Guthrie 1978: 28. On the explanatory limitations of muthos, see Algra 2006: 46-47.  A long-
standing dispute, initiated by Cherniss 1935, concerns the extent to which Aristotle is a fair-
minded reader of his predecessors, or whether Aristotle distorts their views for the sake of 
telling a story that favors the superiority of his own views. Guthrie 1957 defends Aristotle’s 




as Thales making a decisive shift from muthos to logos in explanation – then, a fortiori, 
philosophy’s later development is apt to be even easier. 30   
In identifying philosophy’s initial development as its “most difficult” (χαλεπώτατον) 
stage, one may worry, Sophistical Refutations 34 contradicts Protrepticus 6’s claims for 
philosophy’s easiness. But the initial development of an art or science, Sophistical Refutations 
34 holds, is the most difficult development of any art or science, even the very easiest. So, 
although philosophy’s first moment of development may be its most difficult moment relatively 
speaking, that need not render philosophy overall difficult. 
 
IV. If premise (1) withstands Isocratean challenge, what about the progress argument’s other 
premises? We might question premise (2), viz., that theoretical philosophers do not receive pay 
as a significant incentive to develop their art. Yet Isocrates himself would be inclined to grant 
it. For Isocrates evidently takes pride in the wealth that he, unlike his theoretical opponents, 
had earned from teaching, especially since his family had lost money during the Peloponnesian 
War (Antidosis 145-152; 161). He thinks that the failure of theoretical philosophers to make 
money reveals that their wisdom lacks value (Against the Sophists 3-7). He takes particular 
pride in being counted as wealthy along with Gorgias, and unlike other so-called sophists, who 
make little or no money (Antidosis 155-158). In this context, note that Isocrates identifies both 
pre-Socratic natural philosophers (Antidosis 268) and Plato (To Philip 12) as sophists: Isocrates, 
unlike Plato, does not highlight teaching for pay as a characteristic of sophists.31 His own 
greater wealth, Isocrates may even insist, signals the overall perceived easiness of his rhetorical 
educational program (and the overall toilsomeness of theoretical philosophy). For reasons of 
                                               
30 Surveying the development in the sciences in ancient Greece, Edelstein 1967: 77 writes, “the 
modern verdict too must be that the progress achieved in the fourth century or from the time of 
Anaxagoras to that of Aristotle was incomparably greater than was that of the period from 
Anaximander to Anaxagoras.” 
31 On Isocrates’ pride in his wealth, see Jaeger 1944: 142, 319. On his conception of sophists, 




concision, then, I bracket premise (2).32  Instead, I examine how Isocrates might challenge 
premise (3), the claim that philosophers have made rapid progress. 
In considering premise (1), I assumed that the Isocratean, if pressed, could perhaps 
grant that theoretical philosophers had made some progress. But the Isocratean, in practice, 
rejects this concession. Contrary to premise (3), the Isocratean contends, philosophers 
notoriously have not made rapid progress in attaining exact understanding. For philosophers, 
both in Aristotle’s time and later on, have not converged in any widespread, collective way on 
true answers to major philosophical questions. Instead, philosophers all disagree. Thus, the 
Protrepticus’ claims for philosophy’s progress – and attendant easiness – seem dubious. Here, 
our hypothetical Isocratean foreshadows David Chalmers, who offers these criteria for 
philosophical progress, and who argues that contemporary academic philosophy has failed to 
meet them.33 If Aristotle has a response to Isocrates, then, Aristotle would also have a response 
to the current debate. 
                                               
32 According to premise (2), philosophers did not receive significant external rewards that could 
have incentivized their rapid progress. But one could criticize (2) on the grounds that theoretical 
philosophers received honor from both their students and other theoreticians. And perhaps that 
honor can explain their rapid progress. For Aristotle recognizes that we desire honor not just 
from anybody, but from the wise (EN I.5, 1095b28-30). And he recognizes that those who make 
discoveries are apt to be admired (Metaphysics A.1, 981b13-17). 
   In response, it seems entirely plausible, on the one hand, to think that philosophers – then, as 
now – were (and are) motivated by a search for prestige among other philosophers, and that the 
promise of recognition could well have been incentives to philosophize. Yet recall, on the other 
hand, the complaints of Xenophanes 21B2 and Plato, Republic 528b (discussed by Edelstein 
1952: 597-600, who argues that the sciences in the period were, in fact, held in low esteem). 
Recall, further, the portrayal of theoretical philosophers by the likes of, e.g., Aristophanes and 
Isocrates; the trials (or attempted trials) of Anaxagoras, Socrates, and Aristotle himself; and the 
other indignities visited upon, e.g., Pythagoras and his followers, Xenophanes, and Zeno of 
Elea (detailed by Ahrensdorf 1995: 9-11 and Melzer 2014: 148-153). These cases suggest that 
a substantial portion of non-philosophers took a dim view of philosophy in the Protrepticus’ 
sense, and that one could more readily attain honor elsewhere, e.g., from the practitioners of 
other, already existing arts, as well as from non-artisans who honored those other arts. 
Moreover, the external obstacles that philosophers faced would stand, if anything, actively to 
impede their progress relative to the practitioners of other arts. Therefore, even if honor from 
students and other philosophers were incentives to philosophize, as seems reasonable to 
assume, such honor seems incapable of fully explaining philosophy’s rapid progress. 
Philosophy’s own easiness-conducive features would reasonably have been part of the story. (I 
thank Christopher Moore for questions on these matters.) 




Isocrates himself raises this worry about disagreement. The wisdom that his opponents 
pursue, he says, “is disputed among themselves” (ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων ἀντιλεγοµένην: 
Antidosis 84). The “ancient sophists” could not agree on the number of basic elements of reality. 
At one end, Empedocles proposed four basic elements; at the other, Gorgias denied there were 
any (Antidosis 268).34  Isocrates thus sees theoretical philosophy less as a truth-conducive 
activity than as a merely eristic one (cf. Panathenaicus 26-29; Against the Sophists 1; Helen 1-
6). On this basis, Isocrates argues to young Alexander that he should pursue studies with him, 
rather than Isocrates’ rivals (among them, presumably Aristotle), whom Isocrates thinks engage 
in pointless disputation for its own sake (Letter to Alexander). 
This worry from disagreement is powerful. Aristotle himself recognizes that early 
Greek philosophers disagreed about basic elements (Metaphysics A.3, 983b18-20; DC II.4-5). 
Yet it is striking how Aristotle, as opposed to Isocrates, construes such disagreement. Isocrates 
views such disagreement as a sign of theoretical philosophy’s overall difficulty. For Aristotle, 
however, such disagreement instead signals only the presence of aporiai in things themselves, 
which these disputes concern (Metaphysics B.1, 995a24-26; a30-31). Such aporiai, in turn, 
simply offer invitations to philosophize, i.e., to resolve the aporiai and thereby to resolve any 
existing disputes. Disagreement, then, by itself offers no reason for despair about philosophy’s 
prospects – any more than disagreement in other arts (including medicine) offers reason for 
despair about their own prospects. 
This preliminary response, while reasonable as far as it goes, is not altogether 
sufficient. To bolster his reply, Aristotle can argue for the following three points: (1) The 
existence of some persisting, topical questions of philosophical debate is consistent with 
philosophy’s having made rapid progress in resolving philosophical aporiai. (2) The sorts of 
philosophical aporiai that Aristotle discusses themselves have features conducive to their own 
resolution, with the result that we should reasonably expect many such aporiai to have been 
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resolved. (3) Disagreements among philosophers, to whatever extent they exist, actually have 
features conducive to resolving existing aporiai. 
 On (1): Aristotle admits the existence of some broad, topical philosophical questions –
such as “What is being?” – which have a perennial character (Metaphysics Z.1, 1028b2-4). Yet 
he also recognizes the existence of narrower, aporetic questions about being – the aporetic 
questions that he charts in Metaphysics B, questions such as whether genera are the basic 
elements of a thing or whether the primary constituents of that thing are (B.3, 998a21-23). 
These latter questions differ from broad, topical questions such as “What is being?” For these 
aporetic questions pose dilemmas, for which strong arguments exist on both sides; as stated, 
broad, topical questions do not.  
But Aristotle reasonably suggests that addressing the latter sorts of questions enables 
us to address the former: we must consider aporiai with an eye toward “the science we seek,” 
i.e., toward our investigation into being (cf. B1, 995a24-b4). (a) Aporetic questions provide 
conditions for the possibility of addressing larger, topical questions. Aporetic questions provide 
a starting point for, and give structure to, our inquiry into being. If we inquire without grasping 
the aporiai with which our inquiry confronts us, we do not know where to go. (b) Such aporiai 
enable us to conclude an inquiry. Once we recognize that we have resolved the relevant aporiai, 
our inquiry can come to a rest (B.1, 995a34-b2).35 (c) Answers to aporetic questions about being 
can also actually be constitutive of answers to broader, topical questions. We more fully grasp 
what being is just to the extent that we resolve aporiai about, say, the basic elements of beings. 
Hence, in resolving aporiai, we do make some progress on answering broader, topical 
                                               
35 On Metaphysics B.1 on the role of aporiai as providing the very conditions for inquiry, see 
Politis 2004: 66-77; Long 2006: 46-48; Laks 2009: 26, 45; Code 2010: 97-98, 109. As both 
Long and Code point out, identifying these features of aporiai enable Aristotle to reply to later 
skeptical worries according to which the very existence of aporiai precludes inquiry and 





questions.36 We do so even if the broader, topical questions themselves remain living topics of 
investigation and dispute. 37   
 On (2): The aporiai relevant to an inquiry concerning, e.g., the nature of being result 
from certain intrinsically puzzling features of being as such. When we are puzzled, Aristotle 
suggests, our thinking is metaphorically tied or knotted up; and the knot in our thinking, 
Aristotle maintains, results from a certain “knot” in the object of study (Metaphysics B.1, 
995a29-31). More specifically, the existence of seemingly equally compelling opposing 
arguments on both sides of the dilemma binds our thinking (see Topics VI.6, 145b16-20). But 
this feature of an aporia – its emerging from the existence of two strong conflicting arguments 
–  points the way to the aporia’s own resolution. Thus, Aristotle advises, “For those who wish 
to get clear of aporiai (εὐπορῆσαι) it is advantageous to discuss the aporiai (διαπορῆσαι) well; 
for the subsequent free play of thought (εὐπορία) implies the solution of the previous aporiai, 
and it is not possible to untie a knot of which one does not know” (Metaphysics B.1, 995a27-
30; ROT, emended; cf. 995a33-b2). Once we have examined the arguments on both sides of 
the dilemma, and have understood how the aporetic dilemma arises, we are in a position to 
untie the aporetic knot in our thinking. We can either reject one side of the dilemma (because 
we can reject the argument for that side) or we can identify ways to reconcile the two sides. 
Given that aporiai have the dilemmatic structure they do, we should expect many 
aporiai to have been solved without special impediment, as philosophers have gone about their 
work. Aristotle can point to this historical pattern in the early Greek philosophers’ progress 
beyond Milesian monism in Metaphysics A.3. On the one hand, some reasonings, as articulated 
by the Milesians, strongly support the view that causes are all material principles. On the other 
                                               
36 On the link between larger questions and specific aporiai, see Politis 2004: 66, 82-83. My 
argument in this section has benefited from the stimulating discussion in Stoljar 2017: 12-15; 
26, who distinguishes (1) topic questions – i.e., the highest-level big questions about a topic, 
which usually are questions of definition – from (2) questions within, and about, a given topic. 
While (2) are finer-grained than (1), (2) are still recognizably big questions, and certainly bigger 
than (3) small questions that pertain to particular accounts or discussions of (2).   
37  For the thought that solutions to even modest questions constitute viable forms of 




hand, matter’s inability to change itself strongly suggests the opposed position that not all 
causes are material principles. Hence, a resolution naturally comes to view: some, but not all, 
principles are material. 38  Some early philosophers, e.g., Thales, Anaximander, and 
Anaximenes, did identify only one sort of cause, viz., principles in the form of matter. But 
nature itself was apt to raise trouble for this view, and generated an aporia that, in virtue of its 
dilemmatic structure, was resolvable. In subsequently resolving the aporia, early philosophers 
progressed beyond early materialist views. 
On (3): As Aristotle’s approach to point (2) suggests, intimate familiarity with the 
arguments on behalf of both sides of a dilemmatic aporia conduces to one’s resolving it. Thus, 
Aristotle characteristically surveys the views of his predecessors when he addresses aporiai, 
and he highlights the need to do so: “Further, the one having heard all the opposing arguments, 
as if they were opponents in a lawsuit, must be in a better state with a view to judging” 
(Metaphysics B.1, 995b2-4; cf. Topics I.2, 101a34-37; VIII.14, 163a36-b9; DA I.2, 403b20-24; 
Metaphysics A.3, 983b1-6). Having surveyed existing arguments on behalf of, and against, 
various views, philosophers can discern the strengths and weaknesses of those views and 
arguments. Hence, in articulating views and arguments on behalf of both sides of an aporia, the 
disagreements of philosophers actually benefit those seeking to resolve aporiai. 39 Moreover, 
in their disputes, philosophers articulate endoxa, or reputable opinions, about the subject matter 
under dispute. A proposed resolution to an aporia, however, is sufficiently justified when it is 
capable of preserving the most authoritative endoxa (EN VII.1, 1145b2-7), and finest when it 
is capable of explaining how the aporia arose (Physics IV.4, 211a7-12; cf. EN VII.14, 1154a22-
26).40 So, in their disagreements, philosophers also provide endoxic material conducive to 
                                               
38 Cf. Stoljar 2017: ch. 3 on the sorts of dilemmatic boundary problems, similar to Aristotelian 
aporiai, about which philosophical progress has taken place, and about which it is reasonable 
to expect decent progress to take place. 
39 Politis 2004: 77 emphasizes that familiarizing ourselves with existing disputes “improves 
one’s sensibility to the aporiai generated by the things themselves.” More specifically, I 
contend, such familiarity improves one’s sensibility to what would constitute viable solutions 
to such aporiai. 
40 See DaVia 2017: 395-396. In making these limited claims, I aim largely to bracket ongoing 




justifying proposed resolutions. In these ways as well, philosophy is apt to progress as a 
cooperative enterprise. 
The Isocratean might reply that Aristotle recognizes that it can be difficult even to 
articulate aporiai, let alone unravel and get beyond them (Metaphysics B.1, 996a15-17). Yet 
Aristotle need not hold that philosophy is effortlessly simple; again, his claim is that philosophy 
is overall easy, in spite of the difficulties that it does throw our way. The Isocratean might also 
hold that the solution of one aporia, instead of extinguishing wonder, often seems to generate 
a follow-up aporia, and that philosophy is thus a Sisyphean enterprise. Indeed, as philosophers 
solve some aporiai, Aristotle recognizes, they are taken with wonder by other aporiai 
(Metaphysics A.2, 982b13-15). Yet Aristotle can count the emergence of new aporiai as a sign 
that philosophy does make reasonable progress. For as we make reasonable progress in 
resolving philosophical aporiai, we are apt to develop a sensitivity to other, different “knots” 
with which the world confronts us. So, Aristotle can say, we should not be discouraged if, when 
philosophizing, we encounter new dilemmas to resolve.41 (As intimated in Part I, this state of 
affairs is consistent with philosophy’s full development and successful operation as a mature 
science.) 
 
V. In responding to the Isocratean worry from disagreement, Aristotle can also challenge the 
assumption that widespread collective convergence of philosophical opinion (whether rapid or 
not) is a necessary condition of philosophical progress.42 True, such collective convergence 
may signal philosophical progress. As noted, Aristotle thinks that philosophers are apt to make 
progress when they inquire with other thinkers. Hence, we may reasonably expect the opinions 
of philosophers to converge, to some extent, as some philosophers do attain the truth. Thus, 
                                               
and in what sense. As DaVia 2017 suggests, such claims need not imply, for instance, that 
Aristotle always begins his inquiries by initially surveying endoxa, or that the endoxa that 
Aristotle ultimately attempts to preserve are always endoxa from such an initially surveyed set.   
41 For a different response to the issue of “successor problems,” see Stoljar 2017: 65-66. 
42 Chalmers 2015: 14, who identifies himself as a pluralist about the ways in which philosophy 
can make progress, denies that he is “simply equating” philosophical progress and collective 




prefacing one of his own discussions, Aristotle says, “[I]t would be best for all human beings 
to show agreement with the things to be said; but if they do not, [it would be second best] for 
all [human beings to agree] in a certain fashion, at any rate, which they will do [if they end up] 
changing” their views (EE I.6, 1216b28-30). Consider a scenario in which at least some 
philosophers (a) successfully resolve the aporiai that give rise to discordant philosophical logoi, 
(b) identify principles that account for the phenomena, and (c) explain the sources of these 
aporiai to other philosophers. In such a case, those other philosophers, having attained clearer, 
more exact understanding, should, and many times will, modify their beliefs.43  
But even when philosophical progress occurs, Aristotle does not expect widespread 
collective convergence on the truth. Instead, he holds out hope only that everyone will end up 
agreeing “in a certain fashion, at any rate” (τρόπον γέ τινα: 1216b29-30). For Aristotle 
identifies all kinds of reasons why philosophers may still end up failing to converge collectively 
on the truth, even when some philosophers have successfully performed tasks (a), (b), and (c). 
These reasons include inexperience (Physics I.8, 191a24-27, 191b30-34; cf. EN I.3, 1095a2-4), 
a lack of education (Metaphysics G.4, 1006a6-8), ignorance, and a temptation to seem profound 
(EE I.6, 1217a1-7). Philosophers are prone to fall in love with their views; hence, they tend to 
force the phenomena to fit their favored accounts, rather than the reverse (DC II.13, 293a27-
30; III.7, 306a5-15). Still other philosophers love the feeling of victory in winning arguments; 
hence, they are prone to contrarian desires to defend their theses at all costs (EN I.5, 1096a2).44  
Still, none of these obstacles to widespread agreement should preclude philosophy from 
making overall significant and robust progress. That (some) philosophers are prone to these 
temptations is nevertheless consistent with (other) philosophers’ being able to resist them and 
to move forward. Inexperience, ignorance, lack of education, and temptation, after all, hinder 
all kinds of activities that are, in themselves, generally feasible. Consider, for instance, stock 
market investing. Investor inexperience and ignorance, contrarian commitments to pet stock-
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picking theories, and other limitations and temptations lead most investors, even seasoned 
professionals, to attain returns that fail to match those of the overall stock market. Yet matching 
the overall market remains, by itself, overall easy. One can simply invest in an index mutual 
fund. Acquiring wisdom, of course, need not be that easy. But just as the pervasiveness of 
certain cognitive biases need not make attaining average investment returns, by itself, difficult, 
the same follows for acquiring wisdom.  
At this point, the Isocratean might reply that unless philosophers collectively converge 
on the truth, it is unclear how one can really say that philosophy as a scientific enterprise makes 
any progress at all, and, thus, how one discern any “easiness” regarding philosophy. But here, 
Aristotle can insist that philosophy plausibly counts as progressing when at least some of its 
practitioners progress toward philosophy’s ends – even if other practitioners reject their 
advances. The art of poetry, for instance, makes progress when particular poets make certain 
developments that actually enable the art to attain its mature form. Aristotle credits Homer, for 
instance, with developing the art of poetry by writing the Margites, a work with properly 
comedic elements that progress beyond crude, invective-laden lampoon (Poetics 4, 1448b35-
1449a2). Suppose that Homer alone writes such a transitional work, which Aristotle thinks 
stands in the same relation to comedy that the Iliad and Odyssey stand in relation to tragedy. 
And suppose, further, that others keep writing lampoons. Even then, Aristotle can say, the art 
of poetry itself makes progress when Homer innovates. True, others may (and did) come to 
follow Homer’s lead and write proto-comedies as well. But if individual progress within an art 
or science short of collective convergence can constitute the progress of the art or science, then 
collective convergence within philosophy is not strictly necessary for philosophy’s progress.45 
Finally, Aristotle can deny, more basically, that significant and robust philosophical 
progress even requires at least some philosophers actually to have attained the whole truth that 
they seek. Significant and robust progress can occur in other arts even when those developments 
                                               
45 My response in this section has benefitted from Cappelen 2017: 70-72, who argues that 




do not by themselves attain the ends of those arts. Again, as Sophistical Refutations 34 
contends, the first step in the development of an art or science is the hardest, and, by itself, 
constitutes significant and robust progress. Likewise, significant and robust philosophical 
progress can occur even when philosophers have not yet obtained the whole truth. Such 
progress occurs even when philosophers are on the way toward solutions – i.e., when 
philosophers are progressing toward solutions, and amass parts of the whole truth. Thus, even 
when the early philosophers did not attain the whole truth about causes, Aristotle nevertheless 
reasonably counts them as having made some progress in exactness: pre-Empedoclean 
philosophers progress as far as grasping two of the four causes, if hazily (Metaphysics A.4, 
985a10-14). As suggested by Part II, even when early thinkers were mistaken, they nevertheless 
prepared the way for later efforts to attain more exact (and complete) accounts of the truth. In 
this respect, philosophy is like other arts, such as music. The achievements of the mediocre 
musician Phyrnis, Aristotle suggests, are significant insofar as they provide the basis for the 
achievements of the later, superlative Timotheus (Metaphysics α.1, 993b11-19).  
Insofar as early philosophers rapidly surpassed the practitioners of other arts in 
exactness, all without significant external incentives, then, Aristotle can appeal to their success 
as evidence of philosophy’s overall easiness. Hence, even if acquiring sophia confronts human 
beings with inevitable difficulties, Aristotle can say, the rapid early progress of Greek 
philosophers – and, so, of philosophy as a science – shows that acquiring sophia remains 
feasible for us. Insofar as acquiring sophia is thus free from excessive demandingness and 
toilsomeness, theoretical philosophy, contrary to Isocrates, may yet contribute to our 
happiness.46   
                                               
46 I have presented material from this article at the Rutgers University Classics Department; 
the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy; the Ancient Philosophy Workshop at the University 
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organized by Ronja Hildebrandt and Christopher Roser at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin); the 
University of Hong Kong Philosophy Department; the Eastern APA (in a symposium organized 
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